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THE ACTUAL HARM REQUIREMENT AND THE
FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT:
RINGLING BROTHERS - BARNUM & BAILEY
COMBINED SHOWS, INC. v. UTAH DIVISION OF
TRA VEL DEVELOPMENT'
I. INTRODUCTION

On January 16, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA"), thereby amending the
existing trademark statute, the Lanham Act.2 The FTDA provides
1 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division
of Travel Development, 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
286 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1999).
2 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985
(1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)). The Act states the following: (1) The
owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and
upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against another
person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use
begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive
quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this
subsection. In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court
may consider factors such as, but not limited to - (A) the degree of inherent or
acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the duration and extent of use of the
mark in connection with the goods or services with which the mark is used; (C)
the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the
geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the
channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; (F) the
degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used
by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (G)
the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act
of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. (2) In an action brought
under this subsection, the owner of the famous mark shall be entitled only to
injunctive relief as set forth in section 1116 of this title unless the person against
whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's
reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark. If such willful intent is
proven, the owner of the famous mark shall also be entitled to the remedies set
forth in sections 1117(a) and 1118 of this title, subject to the discretion of the
court and the principles of equity. (3) The ownership by a person of a valid
registration under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or
on the principal register shall be a complete bar to an action against that person,
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a cause of action for federal trademark dilution by entitling the
"owner of a famous mark... to an injunction against another
person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if
such us.e begins after the mark has become famous and causes
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark."3 Courts have
differed as to their interpretation of the language "causes dilution"
and its bearing on the FTDA's relief requirements. Some courts
have held that relief under the FTDA will only be granted if the
senior user can provide evidence that its mark has actually been
diluted by the junior user. Other courts have granted the plaintiff
relief upon a simple likelihood that its mark will be diluted by the
defendant's mark.
In Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Division of Travel Development, the Fourth Circuit held that
the Utah Division of Travel Development ("Utah") did not dilute
the famous mark of Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. ("Ringling") because Ringling failed to demonstrate
that it had suffered actual economic harm due to Utah's use of its
mark.4 However, in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,' the court
rejected the Ringling court's interpretation of the FTDA and held
in favor of the plaintiff. The Nabisco court interpreted the FTDA
to simply require a "likelihood of success" that the plaintiff s mark
will be diluted.6

with respect to that mark, that is brought by another person under the common
law or a statute of a State and that seeks to prevent dilution of the distinctiveness
of a mark, label, or form of advertisement. (4) The following shall not be
actionable under this section: (A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person
in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing
goods or services of the owner of the famous mark. (B) Noncommercial use of
a mark. (C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.

3 Id.
4 170 F.3d 449.
5 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).

6 Id.
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II. HISTORY OF TRADEMARK DILUTION LAW

The trademark dilution theory was first introduced in the United
States by Frank Schechter in 1927. 7 Schechter sought to prevent
the dilution of "coined, arbitrary or fanciful words or phrases that
have been added to rather than withdrawn from the human
vocabulary by their owners, and have, from the very beginning,
been associated in the public mind with a particular product."'
Schechter's model defined dilution simply as "any use of an
identical or sufficiently similar mark"9 and that "the preservation of
the uniqueness of a trademark should constitute the only rational
basis for its protection."' Schechter did not consider any other
harmful effects of the junior's use of the mark other than its
necessary destruction of the senior mark's former absolute
uniqueness as a product symbol." He defined the injury to the
original mark as "the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its
use upon non-competing goods."12 This proposal effectively
creates a property right in gross in such unique marks because the
use of all marks which diminish this uniqueness, even in the
absence of any other type of harm to the unique mark, would be
prohibited. 3
In 1946, Congress passed the Lanham Act.'4 The Lanham Act
extended the infringement cause of action to any junior use of a

7 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection,40 Harv.
L. Rev. 813 (1927). For a further discussion of the history of the dilution
concept see Lori Krafte - Jacobs, Judicial Interpretation of the Federal
TrademarkDilution Act of 1995, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 659 (1998).
8 Id. at 829.
9Id. at 825.
10Id. at 831.
11 Schechter, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 825 (1927).
121d.
13 Ringling v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 454.

14 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1994). This section provides that: (1) Any person
who shall, without the consent of the registrant - (a) use in commerce any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any
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mark that "is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive," but did not include Schechter's proposal for dilution
protection. s However, Schechter's dilution concept did influence
a number of state legislatures. In 1947, Massachusetts became the
first of many states to enact a state antidilution statute.16 According
to the Massachusetts Act, "Likelihood of injury to business
reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade name
or trade-mark shall be a grounds for injunctive relief ...
notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or
of confusion as to the source of goods or services. 17
At the time the Federal Trademark Dilution Act was signed into
law in January, 1996, twenty-eight other states had adopted
antidilution statutes similar to that of Massachusetts. 18 Although
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
15 Id.
16 Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307, s 7a, 1947 Mass. Acts 300 (codified as
amended at Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. llOB, s 12 (West 1996). "Likelihood of
injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark
registered under this chapter, or a mark valid at common law, or a trade name
valid at common law, shall be a ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the
absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the
source of goods or services."
17 Id.

18 The following state statutes were in effect at the time the FTDA was
passed: See Ala. Code s 8-12-17 (1993); Ark. Code Ann. s 4-71-113 (Michie
1996); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code s 14330 (West 1997); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. s
35-11i(c) (West 1996); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, s 3313 (1993); Fla. Stat. Ann. s
495.151 (West 1997); Ga. Code Ann. s 10-1- 451(b) (1994); Idaho Code s
48-512 (1996); 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1035/15 (Michie 1996); Iowa Code
Ann. s 548.113 (West 1996); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. s 51:223.1 (West 1997); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, s 1530 (West 1996); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 11OB, s
12 (West 1996); Minn. Stat. Ann. s 325D.165 (West 1995); Mo. Ann. Stat. s
417.061 (West 1997); Mont. Code Ann. s 30-13-334 (1995); Neb. Rev. Stat. s
87-122 (1994); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. s 350-A:12 (1995); N.J. Stat. Ann. s
56:3-13.20 (West 1996); N.M. Stat. Ann. s 57-3-10 (Michie 1995); N.Y. Gen.
Bus. Law s 368-d (McKinney 1996); Or. Rev. Stat. s 647.107 (1994); 54 Pa.
Cons. Stat. s 1124 (1994); R.I. Gen. Laws 6-2-12 (1992); S.C. Code Ann. s
39-15-1165 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); Tenn. Code Ann. s 47-25-512 (1995);
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. s 16.29 (West 1997); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. s
19.77.160 (West 1997). Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling
Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 789,
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss1/7
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the state antidilution statutes vary in detail, they all share four
important features. 9 First, each statute protects against dilution of
marks which possess a distinctive quality.2" This expands upon
Schechter's proposal which only protected against dilution of
coined arbitrary or fanciful marks that the public associated with a
particular product from the very beginning of their use.2" Second,
the statutes grant relief if the senior user of the mark can
demonstrate that the junior user has caused a "likelihood of
dilution" of the mark at issue. 2 Third, the statutes contain no
express reference to harm of the senior mark's economic value,
therefore defining dilution in terms susceptible to the interpretation
that it consists solely of a loss of the mark's distinctiveness.'
Fourth, the statutes provide only injunctive relief.24
After observing the operation of the dilution concept in the
individual states, Congress decided to incorporate the concept into
federal law. In 1995, Congress voted to amend the Lanham Act to
include the FTDA and on January 16, 1996, President Clinton
signed the bill into law.25 The FTDA differs from the state
antidilution statutes in two respects. First, the FTDA does not
incorporate the "likelihood of dilution" test, using the language

n.18 (1997).

In addition, Ohio has recognized dilution as a grounds for

injunctive relief as part of its common law. Id. See Ameritech, Inc. v. American
Info. Tech. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th Cir. 1987).

19 Many state dilution statutes followed the model state trademark act which
states, "Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the
distinctive quality of a mark registered under this Act, or mark valid at common

law, or a trade name valid at common law, shall be a ground for injunctive relief
notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence

of confusion as to the source of goods or services." Model State Trademark Act
§ 12 (1964), reprinted in, J. Thomas McCarthy, 3 McCarthy on Trademarksand

UnfairCompetition § 22:8 (4th ed. 1999).
20 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 454.

21 Frank I. Schechter, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 829 (1927).
22 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 454.

23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat.
985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (Supp. 1996). See supra
text accompanying note 2.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

5

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 7

DEPA UL J. ART& ENT. LAW

[[Vol. X: 113

"causes dilution" instead.26 Second, the FTDA provides dilution
protection only if the use by the junior user "begins after the mark
'
has become famous."27
III. SUBJECT OPINION: RINGLING BROS.-BARNUM & BAILEY
COMBINED SHOWS, INC. V.UTAHDIVISION OFTRAVEL DEVELOPMENT

A.

Case Facts

Ringling filed a claim under the FTDA alleging that Ringling's
"famous" circus trademark slogan, THE GREATEST SHOW ON
EARTH ("GREATEST SHOW mark"), had been diluted by the
State of Utah's commercial use of its trademark slogan, THE
GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH ("GREATEST SNOW mark"),
used as an advertisement for the state's winter sports attractions."
Since 1872, Ringling and its predecessors have described their
circus to the public as the "Greatest Show on Earth."2' In 1961,
Ringling federally registered its GREATEST SHOW mark for
entertainment services in the nature of a circus.3
The Ringling circus travels throughout the United States and
performs approximately 1,000 shows annually to approximately 12
million people in 95 cities.3" The Ringling circus exposes more
than 70 million people each year to its GREATEST SHOW mark
in connection with its circus.32 In the fiscal year ending in January
1997, Ringling realized revenues exceeding $103 million from
goods and services bearing or using the GREATEST SHOW
mark.33 In the fiscal year ending in January 1997, Ringling spent
approximately $19 million to advertise its GREATEST SHOW
mark in print advertising, radio; television, videos, outdoor

26 Id.
27 Id. (emphasis added).
28 RinglingBros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 451.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 RinglingBros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 451.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss1/7
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billboards, direct-mail, press announcements, posters, program
books, souvenirs, and joint promotions with other companies.34
The Utah Division of Travel Development is an agency of the
State of Utah.3" Since 1962, Utah has used its GREATEST SNOW
mark in connection with its tourism services.36 With the exception
of three years, Utah has used its mark in magazine advertisements
since 1962.37 Utah has also authorized the Utah Ski Association to
use the GREATEST SNOW mark to promote Utah tourism. Utah's
primary use of its GREATEST SNOW mark in Utah is on motor
vehicle license plates.38 Over the past fifteen years, Utah's yearly
budget for winter advertising, including the use of the3 GREATEST
SNOW mark, has ranged from $300,000 to $450,000. 1
In 1975, Utah registered its mark with the State of Utah and
renewed its registration in 1985 and 1995.40 In 1988, Utah applied
for registration of its mark in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office.4 1 Utah was granted federal registration of its
mark on January 21, 1997.42
B. ProceduralHistory
On June 6, 1996, Ringling commenced this action against Utah
in Virginia District Court.43 Ringling alleged that Utah's use of its
GREATEST SNOW mark "diluted" Ringling's GREATEST
SHOW mark in violation of the FTDA.44 Before trial, the district
court granted Utah's motion to strike Ringling's demand for a jury
trial.45 After a bench trial, the district court held in favor of Utah.4 6
34 Id.
35 Id.
36Id.
37 Id.
38 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 451.
39Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 452.
43 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., v. Utah Division
of Travel Development, 955 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1997).
44 Id. at 614.
45 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 453.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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After looking at the language of the FTDA, the district court
concluded that in order for Ringling to prevail on its dilution claim,
it must prove (1) it owns a famous mark, (2) that Utah adopted its
mark after Ringling's mark had become famous; and (3) that
Utah's mark diluted Ringling's mark by "blurring" it.47 The court
found that Ringling had demonstrated that its GREATEST SHOW
mark was famous and that Utah adopted its mark after it became
famous.4 8 Therefore, the court found that the dispute turned on
whether Utah's mark dilutes or has diluted Ringling's mark.49 To
resolve this issue, the court attempted to determine how the
concept of dilution can be detected or measured."
The court concluded that dilution by blurring occurs when
consumers mistakenly associate the famous mark with the goods
and services of the junior mark. 1 The court then examined
Ringling's attempt to prove dilution of its mark. 2 The court
determined that dilution by blurring can be shown through proof
that the use of a junior mark has caused less of a demand for the
products or services bearing the famous mark or for use of the
famous mark in co-promotions.53 Ringling conceded that this did
not occur in this instance but instead attempted to prove dilution
using survey evidence and through the use of a balancing test.54
Ringling's survey evidence demonstrated that within Utah only
25% of the survey respondents, compared to 41% nationwide,
associated the incomplete statement THE GREATEST
ON
EARTH solely with Ringling" Ringling claimed that this survey
evidence was proof that its mark had been diluted by Utah's use of
its mark in the state of Utah. 6 However, the court concluded that
this evidence only indicated that Utah's mark was widely known in
46 Id.
47 RinglingBros. v. Utah, 955 F. Supp. at 612-13.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 RinglingBros. v. Utah, 955 F. Supp. at 616.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 RinglingBros. v. Utah, 955 F. Supp. at 616 (emphasis added).
56 Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss1/7
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Utah57 and not that the people of Utah associated the mark with
Ringling 8 In fact, the evidence demonstrated that 46% of
respondents in Utah, compared to 41% elsewhere, associated the
GREATEST SHOW mark with Ringling.59
Thus, the court concluded that the power of Ringling's famous
mark to identify and distinguish the circus was as strong within
Utah, where the junior mark is ubiquitous, as it was outside of
Utah, where the junior mark was essentially unknown.'
The
survey indicated that Utah's use of the mark did not lessen the
capacity of Ringling's GREATEST SHOW mark to identify and
distinguish the Circus.61 The court found that the survey provided
no direct evidence that Ringling's famous mark had been diluted
and instead held that the survey evidence did not support a finding
of dilution."
Ringling took the position that the FTDA will grant relief for
blurring whenever a junior mark is identical or sufficiently similar
to the famous mark so as to cause consumers to make a mental
association between the two marks.63 Ringling contended that,
although not identical, the similarity between the marks was so
strong and obvious that the required "mental association" between
the two existed and that its mark no longer immediately called to
mind its circus in Utah.'M Therefore, Ringling argued that it was
57 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 955 F. Supp. at 617.
58 Id. at 618.

59 Id.
60 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 955 F. Supp. at 617.
61 Id.
62 Id. See Patrick M. Bible, Defining and Quantifying Dilution Under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence To Show
Actual Dilution, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 295, 314-315 (1999) (As proof of the
existence of mental association, a litigant may offer testimonial evidence from
consumers. Survey evidence provides a more scientific means of demonstrating
trademark dilution. It is often used to prove a likelihood of confusion, since it is
directed to the subjective mental associations and reactions of prospective
purchasers. However, the creation and administration of surveys causes

problems such as inaccuracy. As a result, courts tend to view survey evidence
with a fair amount of skepticism, sometimes leading to the exclusion of the
survey's findings).
63 Id. at 616.
64 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 955 F. Supp. at 617.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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entitled to relief under the FTDA because consumers' mental
association with its mark had been weakened.6
The district court rejected Ringling's contention that mental
association alone between the two marks constitutes dilution under
the FTDA 6 The court held that dilution by blurring occurs only
when consumers "mistakenly associate or confuse the marks and
the goods or services they seek to identify and distinguish," and
"this may be shown by proof that the use of a junior mark has
caused a lessening67of demand for the products or services bearing
the famous mark."
Recognizing that direct evidence of blurring may often be
difficult to present, the court also analyzed Ringling's claim using
a multi-factor balancing test first used by Judge Sweet to determine
dilution under the New York State dilution statute.6 8 This test
balances factors such as (1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the
similarity of the products or services covered by the marks, (3) the
sophistication of consumers, (4) predatory intent, (5) renown of the
senior mark, and (6) renown of the junior mark. 69 After analyzing
and balancing these factors, the court determined that Ringling
failed to prove dilution through blurring.7" The court was most
concerned with the fact that the recreational activities covered by
the marks were not substantially similar and that the marks
themselves were clearly different due to the use of the terms
"show" versus c'snow.' 71
On appeal to the circuit court, Ringling challenged the district
court's holding that Utah's mark did not dilute Ringling's mark
and thus was not in violation of the FTDA.7' Ringling argued that
65 Id. at 614.
66 Id. at 616.
67 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 453.
68 RinglingBros. v. Utah, 955 F. Supp. at 616.

69 Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d at
1035 (2d Cir. 1989).
70 RinglingBros. v. Utah, 955 F. Supp. at 621.

71 Id.
at 619.
72 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 465. The district court first concluded
that the FTDA did not provide a right to a jury trial. Looking at the Seventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the court noted that except where
a defendant 'willfully intended... to cause dilution' the only remedy available

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss1/7
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the district court erred in interpreting the FTDA to require further
proof that in making the mental association between the marks,
consumers must mistakenly associate or confuse the marks and the
goods or services they seek to identify and distinguish. 73 Ringling
further argued that the court erred in interpreting the FTDA to
require proof of actual dilution.74 Specifically, Ringling challenged
the district court's interpretation of the statutory meaning of
"dilution," the court's rejection of its survey evidence as
insufficient to prove "dilution," and the court's rejection of its
dilution claim under Judge Sweet's Mead Data analysis.75
C. Fourth CircuitReview
Agreeing with the district court's finding that Ringling presented
undisputed evidence proving that its mark achieved "famous"
status before Utah began to use its mark, the appeals court focused
on the issue of whether Utah's mark had "diluted" Ringling's
mark. 76 The court of appeals agreed with the district court in
rejecting Ringling's interpretation that the FTDA is violated
simply if consumers develop a mental association between the
famous senior mark and the junior mark. 77 The appellate court also
found that a successful dilution claim under the FTDA requires
proof of (1) a sufficient similarity between marks to evoke in
consumers a mental association of the two that (2) causes (3) actual
harm to the senior marks' economic value as a product-identifying
and advertising agent. 7' The court came to this conclusion by
looking at the immediate legislative record and the broader

to the plaintiff who brings a claim under the FTDA is an injunction. The court
went on to hold that "when an injunction is available to remedy dilution, the
Seventh Amendment does not compel a jury trial.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 452.
77 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 453.
78 Id.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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background out of which the basic concept of dilution emerged and
has evolved in state and federal trademark law.7 9
1. Interpretationof the FTDA
The court began its interpretation of the FTDA with the above
discussion of the history of the dilution concept. The court
examined the concept proposed by Schechter and followed the
evolution of the concept to its embodiment in the FTDA.8" The
court paid special attention to the interpretation and application of
the state antidilution statutes because of the light shed "upon the
significance of key contrasting provisions of the [FTDA]."81 The
Ringling court focused its analysis on determining whether there
was support for Ringling's contention that "dilution under the
[FTDA] required no more proof than sufficient similarity of junior
mark to senior mark to evoke in consumers an 'instinctive mental
association' of the two."82 The court did not attempt to perfectly
synthesize the varying approaches to the interpretive problem taken
by different courts, but did make 83observations which it felt were
relevant to interpreting the statute.
i. State Antidilution
As discussed above, the dilution concept was first seriously
purposed by Frank I. Schechter. According to Schechter, the legal
harm that his dilution proposal sought to prevent was simply the
mark's uniqueness as a word-symbol outside the human
vocabulary as developed by the mark's owner.84 Schechter simply
assumed that all "unique" marks had economic value or selling
power.85 As a result, under Schechter's model dilution could be
proven by a simple showing that a junior mark is sufficiently
79 Id.
80 RinglingBros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 456.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 458.
83 Id.
84 RinglingBros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 456.
85 Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss1/7
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similar to a protected mark. 6 Schechter's proposal did not require
a showing of economic harm for relief to be granted. 7 Such a
dilution model effectively provides property rights in gross to the
owner of the protected and unique mark. 8
At the time the state dilution statutes were enacted the dilution
concept was only expressed in the form proposed by Schechter. 9
However, none of the state statutes adopted Schechter's proposals
exactly.9" Instead, the typical state statute formulation prohibited
the use of a mark that created a "likelihood of ...dilution of the
distinctive quality of a [senior] mark . . . notwithstanding the
absence of competition between the parties or of confusion as to
the source of goods or services."91 The statutes did not elaborate
on this definition or define its terms, thus causing much confusion
in the courts.92
In its examination of how state courts interpreted the state
dilution statutes, the Ringling court found that state courts refused
to read the "distinctive quality" language of the typical state
dilution statutes as being essentially synonymous with the
"uniqueness" language of Schechter's proposal.93 As a result, state
courts refused to provide the high level of protection equivalent to
an in gross property right in the mark as suggested by Schechter.94
Instead, the Ringling court found that state courts often referred to
Schechter's identification of the senior mark's "selling power" and
the "whittling away" of that power and the economic value

86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. citing Robert N. Klieger, TrademarkDilution: The Whittling Away of
the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 789, 802
(1997).
89 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 456.
90 Id.
91 Model State Trademark Act § 12 (1964), reprinted in, J. Thomas
McCarthy, 3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 22:8 (4th ed.
1999).
92 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 456.
93 Id.
94 Id.
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associated with it as being the concerns which the antidilution
statutes were to protect against. 95
According to the Ringling court, the biggest problem in
interpreting the state statutes is determining how to prove that the
junior mark's use has harmed the senior mark's selling power.96 It
is obvious that the public must make some mental association
between the two marks and according to state dilution statutes, this
association and any resulting harm only needs to be proven as a
future likelihood. 97 However, the question that has not been
answered is "how, in the absence of any consumer confusion as to
source, can harm to the senior mark's selling power traceable to the
junior mark's use be proven even as a likely future fact?"'9 8
The Ringling court cited three different approaches to solving the
problem of proving that the junior's use has or is likely to dilute
the senior's mark.9 9 The first approach, used during the period of
judicial hostility to the statutory dilution concept, assumed that the
required harm could only be shown by evidence of some form of
product-diverting consumer confusion." ° Using this approach,
courts consistently found proof of dilution lacking."' The second
approach was developed by Judge Sweet in his often cited Mead
Data concurrence."0 This approach assumed "that likelihood of
harm to the selling power must be proven, and that such harm
could occur in the absence of any consumer confusion."' 0 3 Judge
95 Id.
96 Id. at 457.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 RinglingBros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 457.

101 Id. (citing Cue Publishing Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 45 Misc.2d 161,
168, 256 N.Y.S.2d 239, 245-46 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.), aff'd, 23 A.D.2d 829, 259
N.Y.S.2d 377 (1965) (Evidence failed to demonstrate that defendant's use of

the mark "Cue" for toothpaste diluted plaintiff's registered mark "Cue" for
entertainment guide. The action was brought under the New York State dilution

statute)).
102 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 457 (citing Mead Data Central, Inc.
v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 at 1035) (Sweet, J.,
concurring).
103 Id.
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Sweet developed a series of contextual factors which could be used
to determine if such a likelihood of harm existed."°
The third approach was seen as the most drastic by the Ringling
court.' Using this approach, some courts have taken the position
that a likelihood of harm may simply be presumed from the
identity or sufficient similarity of the marks. 06 The Ringling court
suggested that courts have taken this position because they
consider likelihood of harm to a mark's selling power to be
incapable of inferential proof.0 7 According to Ringling, "this
approach interprets the state statutes as creating property rights in
gross in the senior mark" because instead of requiring proof of a
likelihood of dilution, this approach only requires a "sufficient
similarity" between the two marks.' 8
After examining the different courts' interpretations of the state
dilution statutes, the Ringling court came to the conclusion that a
"general agreement has emerged that "dilution" under the state
statutes involves as an essential element some form of harm to the
protected mark's selling power - its economic value - resulting
otherwise than by consumer confusion from the junior mark's
use.'"" The Ringling court claimed that by requiring proof of only
a "likelihood of dilution" rather than actual dilution under state
antidilution laws, courts have been able to avoid defining the type

104 Id. This test balances factors such as (1) the similarity of the marks, (2)
the similarity of the products or services covered by the marks, (3) the
sophistication of consumers, (4) predatory intent, (5)renown of the senior mark,
and (6) renown of the junior mark. After analyzing and balancing these factors,
the court determined that Ringling failed to prove dilution through blurring.
105 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 457.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. citing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 1988) (in applying
an Illinois statute to uphold an injunction against use of "Greatest Used Car
Show on Earth" slogan, court held that "[w]ithout a likelihood of confusion
there is no effective way to measure [Ringling's] loss of audience or potential
growth," but the court presumed a likelihood of harm for injunctive purposes").
109 RinglingBros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 458.
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of economic harm to the senior mark's "selling power" that is
required to prove statutory dilution." 0
ii. Federal Antidilution
The Ringling court interpreted the FTDA by looking at its
relation to the state statutes and their interpretation."' Comparing
the two statutes the Ringling court emphasized that the FTDA
provides a remedy only for "actual dilution," not a mere
"likelihood of dilution" as described by the state statutes.112 The
court also recognized that by defining dilution as "the lessening of
the capacity of a famous mark, to identify and distinguish goods or
services," the FTDA, unlike the state statutes, makes it perfectly
clear that its aim is to protect the mark's selling power rather than
its distinctiveness."' In light of these two points, the Ringling
court interpreted the requirements for a proof of dilution under the
FTDA as being (1) a showing of a sufficient similarity between the
junior and senior marks to evoke an "instinctive mental
association" of the two by a relevant universe of consumers which
(2) is the effective cause of (3) an actual lessening of the senior
mark's selling power, expressed as "its capacity to identify and
'' 14
distinguish goods and services.
The Ringling court then examined how Ringling's interpretation
of the FTDA fits in with its own. The court saw Ringling's
interpretation as insisting that the FTDA does not require
independent proof that either the economic value of the senior
mark has sustained actual harm or that the junior's use is the cause
of the harm shown."' Instead, Ringling contended that the FTDA
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 d.

113 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1999). "The term "dilution" means the lessening of
the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,
regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of
the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or
deception.
114 RinglingBros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 458.

115 Id. at 459.
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requires only proof of a sufficient visual similarity of the marks to
evoke an "instinctive mental association" between the two
1 16
marks.
The court noted that Ringling's interpretation could be accepted
only if the FTDA was intended to protect the senior mark's
distinctiveness or singularity as a word symbol.117 Such an
interpretation describes the property right in gross model of
dilution originally proposed by Schechter."' The court did not
think that Congress would have intended, without making its
intentions perfectly clear, to create an unlimited in time property
right in gross for famous marks.1"9 The language of the FTDA
states that to succeed on a dilution claim both specific harm to the
senior mark's economic value in the form of a "lessening of
capacity.., to identify and distinguish goods and services," and a
causal connection between that harm and the "commercial use" of
a replicating junior mark must be shown. 120 The Ringling court
concluded that the FTDA certainly does not support the property
right in gross interpretation.'
Although the FTDA requires proof of actual harm to the senior
mark's economic value caused by the junior mark's use, the court
indicated that it would accept Ringling's interpretation if it
permitted both cause and harm to be judicially presumed as fact
from the sufficient similarity of the two marks.1 22 While this
process has been used by some state courts in interpreting state
antidilution statutes which only require proof of likelihood of
dilution, such a process could not be used under a statute requiring
proof of actual harm already caused by use of ajunior mark.'
Such a presumption cannot be made because there are many
factors that may cause a mark to lose its distinctiveness rather than

116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 459.

120 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(1); 1127.
121 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 459.
122 Id.
123 Id.
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the junior party's use of the mark.124 Actual harm cannot be
presumed because there is no guarantee that economic harm will
result from the junior's use of the mark." 5 It is possible that some
junior uses will have no effect at all upon a senior mark's
economic value." 6 This could be due to various reasons such as a
lack of exposure or a general consumer disinterest in the products
used in connection with the marks." 7 In addition, the court
rejected the argument which claims that because there is no way in
which to prove that actual economic harm has occurred, only a
likelihood of dilution is required. 2 According to the Ringling
court, the fact that it may be difficult to prove actual harm does not
support a judicial presumption that it has occurred.' 29
Ringling's principal argument in support of its interpretation is
that if the FTDA requires proof of any form of economic harm, it
is only threatened harm and not actual harm. 30 Ringling argued
that the FTDA's intended meaning should be interpreted so as to
only require a mere "likelihood of dilution" as the state dilution
statutes do, even though a literal interpretation does not support
such a reading.' From this interpretation runs the argument that
future harm can be more easily proven than can a showing of the
actual, consummated economic harm required by the district
court's interpretation.'32
The argument that the FTDA only requires a mere threatened,
future economic harm focuses on the word "capacity" in the
FTDA's definition of the word dilution.'33 The FTDA defines
dilution as the "lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services."' 34 The argument
124 Id.
125 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 457.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 460.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 RinglingBros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 460.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1999).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss1/7

18

Seitz: The Actual Harm Requirement and the Federal Trademark Dilution Ac

1999]

ACTUAL HARM REQUIREMENT

follows that the word "capacity" is used to denote the ability of a
mark to continuously over future time "identify and distinguish,"
even if it has not yet suffered any lessening of that ability.135 The
Ringling court rejected this interpretation as going against the
FTDA's plain meaning."'
The Ringling court held that the interpretation of the word
"capacity" to indicate future harm contradicts both the word's
ordinary intrinsic meaning and its use in context.'
The court saw
the word capacity as having a neutral temporal meaning.'38 To
determine the meaning assigned to a word, the context in which it
is used must be examined.'
As used in the FTDA, the Ringling
court found that "capacity" refers to "former capacity.' ' 40 The
conduct prohibited by the FTDA is that which "lessens"
capacity,' 4' not that which "will" or "may" lessen, 42 and "another
person's... use" that causes dilution,1 43 not merely threatened use
that "will" or "may" cause dilution.1" Unlike only the injunctive
relief provided by state statutes, the FTDA provides compensatory
and restitutionary relief.4 As a result, the court found that the
FTDA focuses not only on the prevention of future harm but also
on relief for consummated economic harm. 146 Most importantly,
the FTDA's conscious refusal to include the words "likelihood of
dilution" indicates that it only intended to protect against actual
dilution. 147
The above reasoning led the Fourth Circuit to conclude that a
violation of the FTDA consists of (1) a sufficient similarity of
marks to evoke in consumers a mental association of the two that
135 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 460.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 460.
141 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
142 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 461.

143 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
144 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 461.
145 Id.
146 Id.

147 Id.
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(2) causes (3) actual harm to the senior marks' economic value as a
product-identifying and advertising agent.148
2. Ringling's Survey Evidence
To prove that Utah's use of its mark dilutes Ringling's famous
149
mark, Ringling introduced the survey evidence described above.
Ringling presented its survey evidence to support its interpretation
that the FTDA provides relief if an instinctive mental association
between the two marks could be shown among consumers. While
the Fourth Circuit did not agree with the district court's finding
that the survey results failed to show that consumers made the
requisite threshold mental association between the marks, this was
not an issue because the court did not agree that a mental
association between marks, by itself, could provide a foundation
for relief under the FTDA 5° The court found that if a party only
relies upon evidence of the mental impressions evoked in
consumers upon viewing the marks, then those impressions must
go beyond mere recognition of a visual similarity of the two marks
to allow a reasonable inference that the junior mark's use has
caused actual harm to the senior mark's selling or advertising
power.15' The court found that Ringling did not meet this
1

standard.

52

3. Mead DataStandard
While the Fourth Circuit did adopt some of the contextual
factors used by the Mead Data court to prove a likelihood of
dilution, as a whole it rejected the use of such factors to prove
dilution under the FTDA.1 3 The court could not see how a test
used to prove "likelihood of dilution" under state statutes could be

148 Id.
149 See supranotes 55-59.
150 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 463.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 463.
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used to determine actual dilution under the FTDA.1 4 The court
singled out the factors of consumer confusion, consumer
sophistication, and predatory intent as being factors which have no
bearing on proving actual harm and effective causation.155 The
only factors which the court felt may have any relevance when
analyzing dilution under the FTDA are mark similarity and
possibly degree of "renown" of the senior mark. 56 Nevertheless,
the court found that the district court's use of the Mead Data
factors had no ultimate prejudicial effect on Ringling.'57
4. Problems with ProvingActual Dilution Under the Ringling
Court'sInterpretation
The Ringling court acknowledged that it is indeed difficult to
prove actual dilution. 5 However, it concluded that the concept of
actual dilution is a viable one and that means of proving actual
dilution are available. 59 Specifically, the court found three general
means of proving dilution."6 The most obvious indicator of actual
dilution is "proof of an actual loss of revenues, and proof of
replicating use as cause of dilution by disproving other possible
causes." 161 The court also condoned the use of a "consumer survey
designed not just to demonstrate 'mental association' of the marks
in isolation, but further consumer impressions from which actual
harm and cause might be rationally inferred." '62 The contextual
Mead Data factors such as the extent of the junior mark's
exposure, the similarity of the marks,. and the firmness of the senior
mark's hold, were found by the court to be indirect evidence that
might complement other proof.63
154 Id.
155 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 463.

156 Id. at 464.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 464.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 465.
161 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 465.

162 Id.
163 Id.
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5. The Ringling Court'sAnswer to the Commentators
In a footnote, the Fourth Circuit answered critics of its reading
that the FTDA requires a showing of actual dilution.6" The court
cited numerous scholarly articles which have examined the issue of
whether the FTDA requires a showing of actual dilution as
opposed to likelihood of dilution.165 The articles conclude that the
FTDA only requires a showing of a likelihood of dilution for relief
and are criticized by the Ringling court for their failure to provide
adequate analysis of their interpretations.166
The court first examined the analysis of the author of one of the
leading treatises in the field, J. Thomas McCarthy.'6 7 According to
McCarthy, "the [FTDA] does not require proof of an actual
lessening of the strength of the famous mark: only that there is a
lessening of the capacity or the ability of the mark to be strong as a
commercial symbol and identifier."'6 8 However, the court placed
little value on McCarthy's analysis due to its failure to provide
further clarifying analysis.'69
The Ringling court also cited an article by Courtland L.
Reichman which determined that although the FTDA requires
actual dilution on its face, a showing of a likelihood of dilution is
adequate due to the use of the word "capacity" to indicate that the
mere ability of a junior user's mark to dilute the senior's mark is
actionable. 7 In addition, the court looked at a article written by
Robert N. Klieger which stated that the plain meaning of "the
[FTDA] creates an actual dilution requirement - junior use of a

164 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 461 n.6.
165 Id.

166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 461 n.6 (citing 3 1 Thomas
McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 24:94 at
24:151).
169 Id.
170 RinglingBros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 461 n.6 (citing Courtland Reichman,
State and Federal Trademark Dilution, 11 Franchise L.J., 111, 132 (Spring

1998).
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mark must actually dilute the senior mark.... However, Klieger
then stated "Of course, Congress did not intend to require... a
showing of actual dilution."172
The Ringling court agreed with the plain meaning interpretation
of the FTDA by Klieger & Reichman.' 73 However, the court
explained that, unlike the two commentators, it was bound to that
plain meaning due to the Supreme Court's "plain meaning rule."7
The "plain meaning rule" states that "If words convey a definite
meaning, which involves no absurdity, nor any contradiction of
other parts of the instrument, then that meaning, apparent on the
face of the instrument, must be accepted." ' Abiding by the plain
meaning of the FTDA as it and others have determined the
meaning to be, the Ringling court found that in order to receive
relief under the FTDA a showing of actual dilution must be
made.'7 6 This Ringling standard has been adopted by many courts
both inside and outside of the Fourth Circuit.
IV. COURTS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

A. UnitedStates Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit recently adopted the Ringling court's
holding that relief under the FTDA requires a showing of actual
dilution in Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. HampshirePaper, Corp.177 In
Syndicate Sales, the court considered whether Hampshire Paper's
floral funeral bouquets diluted the floral funeral bouquets produced
by Syndicate Sales. 78 While Syndicate Sales had been producing
171 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 460 n.6 (citing Robert N. Klieger,

Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark
Protection,58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 789, 840 (1999)).
172 Id.
173 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 460 n.6 (citing Lake County v.

Rollins, 130 U.S. 662 at 670 (1889)).
174 Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 460 n.6.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper, Corp., 193 F.3d 633 (7th Cir.
1999).

178 Id. at 635.
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its bouquets since 1960, Hampshire Paper had only been producing
its bouquets since 1994.'
In 1994, Hampshire Paper produced
two types of bouquets which contained teardrop-shaped handles
along with round buckets and bases with triangle supports which
were very similar to the bouquets already being produced at the
time by Syndicate Sales. 80 In addition, the lattice work on the
handles of the bouquet buckets made by Hampshire Paper was very
similar to the lattice work on the buckets made by Syndicate
Sales. 8'
Syndicate Sales filed a claim under the FTDA alleging that by
manufacturing bouquets similar in appearance to its own,
"Hampshire Paper is trading on Syndicate Sales' reputation,
thereby diluting its allegedly famous trade dress."' 2 In stating
what the plaintiff must prove to succeed on a claim of dilution
under the FTDA, the Seventh Circuit cited the test developed by
the Ringling court.'83 The Seventh Circuit agreed that for the
plaintiff to succeed on a claim of dilution under the FTDA the
"plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence that (1) the mark is
famous; (2) the alleged infringer adopted the mark after the mark
became famous; (3) the infringer diluted the mark; and (4) the
defendant's use is commercial in commerce.'84 While the Seventh
Circuit did not examine whether actual dilution had been shown, it
did indicate that a showing of actual dilution would be required to
85
obtain relief under the FTDA.1

179 Id.
180 Id.
181Id.
182 Id.
183 Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. HampshirePaper,Corp., 193 F.3d at 639.
184 Id. (citing Ringling v. Utah, 170 F.3d 449, 452 (4th Cir. 1999).

185 Id. The main issue before the Seventh Circuit was whether Syndicate's
trade dress in its bouquet was famous. The district court found that even if
Syndicate's trade dress was famous, it was only famous among wholesalers and
retail florists. The district court held that fame in such a niche market cannot be
sufficient to establish fame for purposes of the FTDA. However, the Seventh
Circuit disagreed with this ruling and held that fame may be construed to a
particular market. The court came to this conclusion by examining the language
of the FTDA.
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B. United States DistrictCourtfor the Southern Districtof
Florida
The requirement that a showing of actual dilution be made in
order for relief to be granted under the FTDA was also adopted in
Carnival Corp. v. SeaEscape Casino Cruises, Inc.186 In Carnival,
Carnival Corp. alleged that SeaEscape's slogan, "SeaEscape to a
Ship Full of Fun!" to describe its six-hour gambling cruise,
infringed and diluted its "Fun Ship" mark to describe its ocean
liners which offer cruises of typically seven days.187 The court
used the Ringling 8s8 factors cited in Syndicate89 as being the
requirements which the plaintiff must satisfy if it is to be granted
relief under the FTDA. However, as in Syndicate the court did not
ultimately make a decision as to whether the distinctive quality of
the senior's mark was diluted because the court found that the
mark at issue was not famous as required for relief under the
FTDA.' 9°
According to the FTDA, when determining whether a mark is distinctive and
famous, the court may consider "the degree of recognition of the mark in the
trading areas and channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person
against whom the injunction is sought." The court acknowledged that though
the market in which the bouquets were sold was very narrow, when the
defendant uses a mark in the same field as the plaintiff, the narrowness of the
market is not as important. The case was remanded to determine whether, in the
market as the Seventh Circuit defined it, the trade dress of Syndicate Sales was
sufficiently famous.
186 Carnival Corp. v. SeaEscape Casino Cruises, Inc., 74 F. Supp.2d 1261
(S.D. Fla. 1999).
187 Id.
188 Ringling v. Utah, 170 F.3d 449, 452 (4th Cir. 1999).
189 Syndicate v. Hampshire,193 F.3d at 639.
190 Carnival v. SeaEscape, 74 F. Supp.2d 1261. In order to prove that its
"Fun Ship" mark was famous, Carnival used a consumer survey. The survey
results revealed that when used without the mark "Carnival," consumers only
identified the "Fun Ship" mark as being associated with Carnival less than 5%
of the time. Due to this lack of association, the court held that the "Fun Ship"
mark was less distinct and less famous than the "Carnival" mark and therefore
less deserving of protection.
In a further attempt to prove that its "Fun Ship" mark was famous, Carnival
introduced evidence of a survey of consumers who were "very or somewhat
interested in taking a cruise ship vacation in the next three years." In this
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C. United States DistrictCourtfor the DistrictofMaryland
The Fourth Circuit's requirement that actual economic harm be
shown in order to prevail on a claim of dilution under the FTDA
was recently followed by the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland. In World Gym Licensing, Ltd. v. Fitness
World, Inc.,"' the court held that Fitness World's use of its
"Fitness World" mark and globe symbol infringed on World
Gym's "World Gym" mark and globe symbol.19 However, the
court found that Fitness World did not dilute World Gym's
193
mark.
The court held that for relief to be granted under the FTDA, the
plaintiff's claim must satisfy the three factor test of Ringling.1 94 To
establish dilution the court held that the plaintiff must prove that:
1) defendant has made use of a junior mark sufficiently similar to
the famous mark to evoke in a relevant universe of consumers a
mental association of the two that 2) has caused 3) actual economic
harm of the famous mark's value by lessening its former selling
power as an advertising agent for its goods or services. 95 The
court assumed that World Gym's marks are famous and that the
name Fitness World evokes "a mental association" with World
Gym Fitness Centers.1 96 Thus, the court saw the question as being
whether Fitness World's use of its mark caused actual economic
survey, 68% of the respondents stated that they were familiar with the "Fun
Ship" slogan and 58% were able to associate the slogan with Carnival. These
results indicate that the "Fun Ship" mark has achieved a level of fame in the
niche-market of consumers intending to purchase a cruise. While such niche
market fame may be adequate to support a claim under the FTDA if the marks
are used in the same market segments as the Syndicate court held, the Carnival
court held that such fame would not be sufficient where the marks are used in
different market segments. The Carnival court held that consumers wishing to
gamble for a few hours on a riverboat were not in the same market segment as
those wishing to purchase a multi-day cruise on a large ocean liner.
191 World Gym Licensing, Ltd. v. Fitness World, Inc., 47 F. Supp.2d 614 (D.

Md. 1999).
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 625 (citing Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 460.)
195 Id.
196 World Gym Licensing, Ltd. v. Fitness World, Inc., 47 F. Supp.2d at 625.
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harm to the World Gym mark's value, i.e. "whether its former
selling power as an advertising agent for World Gym's goods or
197
services has been lessened."
World Gym claimed that the difficulty it will have in licensing
its trademarks if Fitness World and others can use its marks
without charge is sufficient proof that it has suffered economic
harm.'
To determine if World Gym's claim was sufficient to
prove that it had suffered actual harm the court looked to the
Ringling opinion. 9 9 According to Ringling, actual harm to a mark
may be shown through 1) proof that an actual loss of revenues has
occurred; 2) a skillfully constructed survey; and 3) such relevant
contextual factors such as the extent of the junior mark's exposure,
the similarity of the marks, and the firmness of the senior mark's
hold. 2o
After examining the evidence provided by World Gym in its
attempt to prove that it suffered direct economic harm, the court
found the evidence insufficient to provide the proof that Ringling
demands.20 ' World Gym's evidence did not indicate an actual loss
of revenues, presented no survey evidence, and failed to explore
any of the contextual factors mentioned by the Ringling court. 02
As a result, the court found that Fitness World's use of its marks
did not dilute World Gym's marks.20 3
D. United States District Courtfor the DistrictofNew Jersey
In American Cyanamid Co. v. Nutraceutical Corp., the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey examined
whether Nutraceutical's Solaray and Kal products diluted
American Cyanamid's Centrum products."' The dispute centered
197 Id
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.

201 World Gym v. Fitness World, 47 F. Supp.2d at 625.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 American Cyanamid Co. v. Nutraceutical Corp., 54 F. Supp.2d 379 (D.

N.J. 1999).
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upon Nutraceutical's use of labels incorporating colors of the
visual spectrum."'
Nutraceutical claimed that American
Cyanamid's labels are not sufficiently similar to its own and that
American Cyanamid's trademark is not famous as required by 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).206 For purposes of the motion the court was
deciding, the court accepted that Centrum's trademark was famous
and identified the key issue as being whether Nutraceutical's labels
were sufficiently similar to Centrum's trademark to be capable of
20 7
diluting its mark.
The court stated that it would find the marks to be sufficiently
similar if consumers regarded the marks as "essentially the same"
or made an "instinctive mental association" between the two
marks. 2" After examining the marks, the court found that the only
real similarity between the marks was the use of colors in the
general order in which they appear in the visual spectrum. 2' The
court found that the overall impressions created by the marks were
distinct from one another and that Nutraceutical's mark was
incapable of triggering a mental association in the minds of the
consumers between the two marks. 10
However, the court found that in addition to the marks not being
sufficiently similar, American Cyanamid's failure to offer "any
evidence of actual lessening of Centrum's selling power through its
mark's capacity to identify and distinguish goods and services"
was equally destructive of its case.21 American Cyanamid's
dilution claim failed as a matter of law because it offered "no
2 12
evidence by which a jury could find actual dilution.

205 Id. at 382.
206 See supra note 2.
207 American Cyanamid v. Nutraceutical,54 F. Supp.2d at 392.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 394.
212 American Cyanamidv. Nutraceutical,54 F. Supp.2d at 394.
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E. The United States DistrictCourtfor the CentralDistrictof
California,Southern Division
The actual dilution requirement of the Ringling court was again
followed by the United States District Court, C.D. Cal, Southern
Division.
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape
Communications Corp., the court examined whether Netscape
infringed and diluted Playboy's trademarks "Playboy" and
"Playmate."'2 3 Playboy claimed that Netscape "infringed and
diluted its marks by marketing and selling the group of over 450
words, including "Playboy" and "Playmate," to advertisers, by
programming the banner advertisements to run in response to the
search terms "Playboy" and "Playmate" and by actually displaying
the banner advertisements on the search results page. ' 214 Playboy
contended that Netscape's use of its marks diverted users from its
official web site and those it sponsors to other adult entertainment
sites. 21' The court found that Netscape did not infringe Playboy's
marks because Playboy did not show that confusion among
consumers was likely to result from Netscape's use of the marks.216
In determining whether Netscape diluted Playboy's marks, the
court followed the reasoning set forth in Ringling.217 The court
held that the three part Ringling test must be satisfied in order to
establish a claim of dilution.21 ' The court rejected Playboy's claim
of dilution due to a lack of evidence indicating that Netscape's use

213 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F.
Supp.2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999) affid No. 99-56230, 99-56231, 1999 WL
1049614 (9th Cir. 1999).
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. citing Ringling v. Utah, 170 F.3d 449.
218 Playboy v. Netscape, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1075. The Ringling court
interpreted the requirements for a proof of dilution under the FTDA as being (1)
a showing of a sufficient similarity between the junior and senior marks to
evoke an "instinctive mental association" of the two by a relevant universe of
consumers which (2) is the effective cause of (3) an actual lessening of the
senior mark's selling power, expressed as "its capacity to identify and
distinguish goods and services."
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of Playboy's marks caused Playboy actual harm.2 19 The court
found that Playboy failed to present evidence of any lessening of
the capacity of the marks to identify and distinguish Playboy's
goods and services as a result of Netscape's conduct.220
F. United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin
The Eastern District of Wisconsin addressed the actual dilution
requirement in National Football League Properties, Inc. and
Green Bay Packers,Inc. v. Prostyle,Inc.22 The National Football
League and the Green Bay Packers football team claimed that
Prostyle diluted its marks by selling unauthorized merchandise. 22
The main issue in this case was whether survey evidence provided
by the Green Bay Packers to demonstrate dilution should be
excluded.223 According to Prostyle, the survey evidence should not
be admitted because the survey essentially asked only one
question, "What, if anything, do you think of when you see this
'
shirt?"224
The court held that the Green Bay Packer survey was not
admissible because it lacked sufficient control questions or control
shirts and was not as comprehensive as required by the court.225
The court was also concerned that the survey evidence did not
meet the requirements set forth in Ringling for succeeding on a
federal dilution claim.226 The court cited Ringling for the
propositions that if a claim of dilution relies "only upon evidence
of the mental impressions evoked in consumers upon viewing the
marks," the impressions must go beyond the recognition of the
marks' similarity and "allow a reasonable inference that the junior
mark's use has caused actual harm to the senior mark's selling or
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 National Football League Properties, Inc. and Green Bay Packers, Inc. v.
Prostyle, Inc., 57 F. Supp.2d 665 (E.D. Wis. 1999).
222 Id. at 666.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 668.
225 Id.
226 NationalFootballLeague Propertiesv. Prostyle, 57 F. Supp.2d 671.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss1/7
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advertising power.""
Thus, a survey used to prove dilution
should be designed "not just to demonstrate 'mental association' of
the marks in isolation, but further consumer impressions from
which actual harm and cause might rationally be inferred.""22 The
Green Bay Packers' failure to show actual harm also influenced the
court's decision to exclude the evidence.229
IV. COURTS WHICH DISAGREE WITH THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

A. United States Court ofAppealsfor the Second Circuit
The Ringling court's requirement that actual harm be shown in
order to prove dilution has been rejected by the Second Circuit. In
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., PF Brands moved to enjoin
Nabisco from selling and distributing an "orange, bite sized,
cheese-flavored goldfish-shaped cracker" that closely resembled
PF Brands' trademark Goldfish cracker. " The district court found
in favor of PF Brands and granted a preliminary injunction on the
federal and state dilution claims, but not on the federal trademark
infringement or state unfair competition claims.2 3' In finding that
Nabisco's fish-shaped cracker would likely dilute PF Brand's fishshaped cracker, the court used the six-factor Mead Data test.232 The
court also concluded that "a showing of a likelihood of dilution
'
will automatically establish irreparable harm."233
Nabisco's appeal
claimed that, among other things, dilution cannot be found without
227 Id. (citing Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 463).
228 Id.
229 Id. The court claims that in LP. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., (163 F.3d
27) the court reached the same conclusions as the Ringling case concerning the
necessity of showing actual harm in a dilution case. However, this is not

correct. LP. Lund rejected the requirement of showing that "the use of a junior
mark has caused a lessening of demand for the product or services bearing the
famous mark." LP. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., (163 F.3d at 49 (1st Cir. 1998).
230 Nabisco, Inc. v. PFBrands,Inc., 191 F.3d 208 at 212.
231 Nabisco, Inc. v. PFBrands,Inc., 50 F. Supp.2d 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
232 Id. at 201 (citing Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,
Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989) Sweet, J. concurring).

233 Id. at 210 (citing Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 860 F. Supp. 113,
122 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
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documentation of actual injury, consisting of an actual reduction in
the senior mark's selling power. 4
Relying on the reasoning of the Ringling court, Nabisco asserted
that proof of dilution under the FTDA requires proof of an "actual,
consummated harm."235 The Second Circuit rejected Nabisco's
argument, citing its disagreement with the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation of the FTDA in Ringling.2 36 The Second Circuit was
unable to determine if Ringling supported the narrow interpretation
that "courts may not infer dilution from contextual factors (Mead
Data factors such as degree of mark and product similarity, etc.),
but must instead rely on evidence of actual loss of revenues or the
skillfully constructed consumer survey," or the broader
interpretation that "the actual consummated dilution element would
require not only that dilution be proven by a showing of lost
revenues or surveys but also that the junior mark be already
established in the market place before the senior user can seek an
injunction." 237
The Second Circuit did not agree that a showing of actual
revenue loss should be required to gain relief under the FTDA.238
The court explained that if a famous mark has continually been
diluted for an extended period of time, it may be difficult for the
senior user to show diminished revenues because there would be
234 Nabisco v. PF Brands, 191 F.3d 208 at 214 (2d Cir. 1999). Nabisco's
primary contentions on appeal were that: (1) Pepperidge Farm failed to show
likelihood of success in proving dilution, because, in the market context (a)
consumers would not associate the two products, and (b) Nabisco's mark was

not substantially similar to Pepperidge Farm's; (2) the antidilution statutes were
adopted to protect against dilution by the use of a similar mark on a noncompeting product and do not apply to trademarks on competing products,
which are governed instead by the infringement standard; (3) Nabisco's use of a

fish is not a "trademark use" and is thus not actionable under the antidilution
statutes; (4) dilution cannot be found without documentation of actual injury,
consisting of an actual reduction in the senior mark's selling power.
235 Id. at 223 (citing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc.
v. Utah Division of Travel Development, 170 F.3d at 464 (4th Cir. 1999).
236 Id.
237 Id. (citing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Division of Travel Development, 170 F.3d at 457, 464-65).
238 Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss1/7
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no way in which to measure what the revenues would be without
the junior mark's influence. 239 Also, any diminished revenues that
could be shown would be speculative and it would be difficult to
prove that the loss was due to the dilution of the mark.240 The
Fourth Circuit's suggestion that survey evidence be used to show
proof of dilution was also rejected by the Second Circuit because it
determined that such evidence could be easily manipulated.24
The Second Circuit further disagreed with the Fourth Circuit in
its rejection of the belief that the alternative to a proof of actual
'
harm is reliance on inflexible "judicial presumptions."242
The
Second Circuit saw no reason why the owner of a famous mark
could not rely on persuasive circumstantial evidence of dilution of
the distinctiveness of its marks without being obligated to show
lost revenue or engage in an expensive battle of unreliable
surveys.243 The Second Circuit took the view that the use of
circumstantial evidence does not involve presumptions, instead (as
in virtually all other areas of the law) the use of such evidence
allows for fact finding by drawing logical inferences from other
established facts. 2"
The Second Circuit also rejected the Fourth Circuit's broader
reading which requires not only that dilution be proven through a
showing of lost revenues or surveys, but also that the junior be
already established in the marketplace before the senior can seek
an injunction.245 The Nabisco court believed that the Fourth
Circuit read the FTDA too literally in focusing on the fact that it
uses the terms "causes dilution" rather than referring to "likelihood
'
of dilution."246
According to the Second Circuit, this "excessive
literalism" defeats the intent of the statute.247 Despite the FTDA's
use of the present tense in the language "causes dilution," the court
239 Nabisco v. PFBrands,191 F.3d 208 at 223.
240 Id. at 224.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 224 n.5 (citing Ringling v. Utah, 170 F.3d at 464).

243 Id. at 224.
244 Nabisco v. PFBrands,191 F.3d 208 at 224 at n.5.
245 Id. at 224.
246 Id.
247 Id.
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found it plausible that the statute intended to provide injunctive
relief so as to prevent the harm before it occurs.24
The Second Circuit also came to the conclusion that the Fourth
Circuit's reading of the FTDA harms both the senior and junior
users."4 The senior user is harmed because the statute can only be
invoked after an injury has occurred and only provides injunctive
relief, not damages."'
The junior user would also be
disadvantaged by the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the Ringling
decision because such an interpretation prevents the junior user
from knowing whether it will be prohibited from using its new
mark until after it actually implements the mark in the
marketplace."' As a result, the junior user will be obligated to
spend a large sum of money to introduce its mark -to consumers
without the judicial assurance that the mark will not be enjoined. 2
The Second Circuit failed to make a conclusion as to its
interpretation of Ringling's exact holding. Instead, the court
rejected Ringling and interpreted the FTDA as providing relief
before dilution has actually occurred.253 As a result, the Second
Circuit agreed with the district court in holding that PF Brands is
likely to succeed in establishing that Nabisco's use of its goldfish
shape in an orange, cheddar-cheese-flavored, bite-sized cracker
dilutes the distinctive quality of PF Brand's previously famous
mark, consisting of a goldfish-shaped orange, cheddar-cheeseflavored, bite-sized cracker. 4
248 Id.
249 Nabisco v. PFBrands,191 F.3d 208.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 The court came to this conclusion after examining extrinsic factors
adopted by the Second Circuit in PolaroidCorp. v. PolaroidElectronics Corp.
287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). The factors considered in Nabisco were
distinctiveness of the mark, similarity of the marks, proximity of the products
and likelihood of bridging the gap, interrelationship among the distinctiveness
of the senior mark, shared consumers and geographic limitations, sophistication

of consumers, actual confusion, adjectival or referential quality of the junior
use, harm to the junior user and delay by the senior user, and effect of the senior
user's prior laxity in protecting the mark. Nabisco v. PFBrands,191 F.3d 208.
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B. UnitedStates Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
The First Circuit court of appeals addressed the necessity of
showing actual dilution under the FTDA in I.P. Lund Trading v.
Kohler Co. 255 I.P. Lund Trading (Lund) claimed that Kohler's
Falling Water faucet, a faucet which resembled Lund's VOLA
faucet, diluted the VOLA faucet's trade dress under the FTDA 6
The district court granted Lund's request for an injunction finding
that Lund had fulfilled the FTDA's requirement of showing that
Kohler's mark had caused a lessening of demand for its product or
services bearing its famous mark.257
The First Circuit rejected the district court's requirement that a
lessening of demand for the product or services bearing the famous
mark be shown." 8 It reasoned that a showing of actual harm was
not required because "demand for one product is almost always
lessened whenever a competing product achieves a measurable
degree of success."259 The court also found that blurring refers to
the identification of a product which is not the same thing as a
lessening of demand. 2'
The court concluded that the test for dilution is whether
consumers of the particular product are likely to view the senior
product with the famous mark as being the same as the junior
product bearing the similar mark.26 However, the court was
reluctant to apply the FTDA in this case because it was unsure if
Congress intended product design trade dress to be covered by the
FTDA and if the FTDA may even be constitutionally applied to
trade dress cases.262 The court's determination that Lund's product
was not famous allowed it to reject the dilution claim and avoid
255 I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998).
256 Id. at 32.
257 I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 11 F. Supp.2d 112, 126 (D. Mass.
1998) (citing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., v. Utah
Division of Travel Development, 955 F. Supp. at 616 (E.D. Va. 1997).
258 I.P. Lund v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d at 49.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id at 50.
262 Id.
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having to determine if the FTDA would apply and how dilution
must be proven in this situation. However, it did reject the
Ringling requirement of having to demonstrate actual harm.
C. UnitedStates Court ofAppealsfor the Ninth Circuit
1. PanavisionInternational,L.P. v. Toeppen
In PanavisionInternational,L.P. v. Toeppen,26s the Ninth Circuit
addressed the requirement of proving actual dilution under the
FTDA. In a footnote, the court defined blurring as occurring
"when a defendant uses a plaintiffs trademark to identify the
defendant's goods or services, creating the possibility that the mark
will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier of the plaintiffs
product." 2" The court cited Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey,
Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows, Corp.265 for this
proposition which in turn cited Deer & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc.,2"
a case decided before the FTDA was even enacted.
Panavision claimed that Toeppen's use of its "Panavision" mark
as the address for Toeppen's "Panavision.com" web site diluted
Panavision's mark.267 Toeppen claimed that he was not diluting
the capacity of the Panavision marks to identify goods or
services.26 He argued that even though Panavision cannot use
Panavision.com as its domain name address, it can still promote its
products on the Internet by using some other address and then
creating a web cite using its trademarks internally.269

263 Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir.

1998).
264 Id. at 1325 n.7 (citing Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 955 F. Supp at 116
(emphasis added).
265 937 F. Supp. 204, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

266 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994).
267 Id. at 1326.
268 Id.

269 Id. at 1326-1327.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss1/7

36

Seitz: The Actual Harm Requirement and the Federal Trademark Dilution Ac

1999]

ACTUAL HARM REQUIREMENT

149

The court found that a web site domain name is more than just
an address, it is an identifier of the entity that owns the web site.270
The court found that potential customers would be discouraged if
they could not find Panavision's web page using the address
"Panavision.com" and as a result, the value of the "Panavision"
mark was diluted.27'
In conclusion, the court found that
"Toeppen's registration of Panavision's trademarks as his domain
names on the Internet diluted those marks within the meaning of
the FTDA, and the California Antidilution statute. 22 The court did
not make a distinction between the requirements of the FTDA and
the California state antidilution statute.
2. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Jerry Sumpton
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the requirement of showing
actual dilution in Avery Dennison Corp. v. Jerry Sumpton.273 Avery
Dennison sued Sumpton for trademark dilution under the FTDA.274
Mr. Sumpton is the president of a company which offers "vanity"
e-mail addresses to users.' 5 Most of the addresses registered by
Sumpton are common surnames.2 76 Avery Dennison sells office
products under the registered marks "Avery" and "Dennison,"
respectively.277
Avery Dennison objected to Sumpton's
maintenance of domain name registrations for avery.net and

270 Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1327 (9th Cir.

1998).
271 Id.
272 Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 14330.
273 Avery Dennison Corp. v. Jerry Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
274 Id. A claim was also bought under the CA dilution Act. The CA dilution
Act grants relief if the plaintiff can demonstrate that "likelihood of injury to
business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark ...
notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence

of confusion as to the source of goods or services." Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code §
14330.
275 Id. at 872.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 873.
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dennison.net, claiming that
they diluted Avery Dennison's marks
278
"Avery" and "Dennison.
2 79 for the standard under which the
The court cited Panavision
FTDA would grant relief. However, as discussed above the
Panavision court derived its definition of dilution by blurring from
a case that was decided under a state dilution statute.280 The court
agreed with Panavision's interpretation of the FTDA which
provides relief if the plaintiff can establish that (1) the mark is
famous; (2) the defendant is making commercial use of the mark in
commerce; (3) the defendant's use began after the plaintiffs mark
became famous; and (4) the defendant's use presents a likelihood
of dilution of the distinctive value of the mark.281 Without
implementing this standard, the court found that the district court's
grant of summary judgment was unwarranted because a reasonable
finder of fact could infer that dilution does not occur with the .net
address extension used by Sumpton in the marks he registered.282
D. UnitedStates DistrictCourtfor the Southern Districtof
Texas, Houston Division
The District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston
Division, addressed the requirements of relief under the FTDA in
Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece.2 83 In Elvis Presley
Enterprises, the owner of the trademarks and publicity rights
belonging to the estate of Elvis Presley sued the owners of a
278 Dennison v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d at 874.
279 PanavisionInt'l,L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316.
280 Id. The Panavision court cited Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey,
Combined Shoes, Inc. v. B.E. Windows, Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 209 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), which cited Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 29, 43 (2d Cir.
1994). The Deere decision was decided under state dilution law.
281 Id. at 1324 (emphasis added).
282 Id.
283 Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Tex.
1996) rev'd on other grounds 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998). The court found
that (1) district court failed to consider impact of defendants' advertising
practices on their use of the service mark and misapplied doctrine of parody; (2)
"The Velvet Elvis" mark infringed plaintiffs marks; (3) action was not barred
by laches; and (4) plaintiff was entitled to injunction.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss1/7
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nightclub which operated under the service mark "The Velvet
Elvis" alleging unfair competition, infringement, and dilution.284
According to the court, to prevail on a claim of dilution, the
plaintiff must establish ownership of a distinctive mark and a
"likelihood of dilution., 28" The court found that Capece did not
dilute the marks owned by Elvis Presley Enterprises because there
was "very little likelihood that Defendants' parody will weaken the
association among the "Elvis" or "Elvis Presley" trademarks and
products marketed by Elvis Presley Enterprises. 2 6
E. UnitedStates DistrictCourtfor the Southern Districtof New
York
In Conopco, Inc. v. Cosmair, Inc., Conopco requested that
Cosmair be preliminarily enjoined from selling or advertising its
ROMANCE fragrance.2"7 According to Conopco, (the licensee of
Calvin Klein) Cosmair (the licensee of Ralph Lauren) attempted to
infringe and eventually destroy its federally registered trademark in
the "icon bottle. 2 8 Conopco alleged that Cosmair's ROMANCE
perfume, which is sold in a bottle that has a similar shape and
appearance as Conopco's "icon bottle," will dilute the distinctive
quality of the ETERNITY perfume bottle in violation of the
FTDA.8 9
The Conopco court cited Nabisco in holding that in order to
prevail on a claim of dilution under the FTDA the two elements
284 Id.
285 Id. at 797 (emphasis added) citing Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson
Productions,Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2nd Cir. 1996). Hormel involved a claim
under the NY state dilution statute. The statute stated that "Likelihood of injury
to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctiveness quality of a mark or
trade name shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases of infringement of a
mark registered or not registered or in cases of unfair competition
notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence
of confusion as to the source of goods or services." N.Y.Gen.Bus.Law § 368-d
(McKinney 1984).

286 Id. at 798.
287 Conopco, Inc. v. Cosmair, Inc., 49 F. Supp.2d 242, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
288 Id.
289 Id. at 257.
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that must be shown are "(1) ownership of a famous mark; and (2) a
likelihood of dilution.""90 According to Conopco, a likelihood of
dilution is determined by applying the six factor test of Mead
Data.21' After an examination of the Mead Data factors, the court
was not convinced that Conopco could establish a likelihood of
dilution. The court held that the bottles are dissimilar, are
purchased by sophisticated and discriminating consumers, that
there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of Cosmair, and that
there was no evidence that the ETERNITY bottle was a strong
mark.292 Due to Conopco's failure to show that the ETERNITY
bottle is famous within the FTDA, or that the ROMANCE bottle or
trade dress is likely to lessen the ability of the ETERNITY mark to
be an indicator of source, the court did not grant Conopco's request
293
for a preliminary injunction under the FTDA.

F. UnitedStates DistrictCourtfor the EasternDistrictof
Pennsylvania
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania addressed the requirement of actual dilution in Times
MirrorMagazines,Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L. C.294 Times
Mirror claimed that Las Vegas Sports News' use of the mark "Las
Vegas Sporting News" as the title of its publication dilutes Times
Mirror's use of its mark "The Sporting News" on its publication.295
The court cited the proposition that "dilution by blurring occurs
when a defendant uses a plaintiffs trademark to identify the
defendant's goods or services, creating the possibility that the mark
will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier of the plaintiffs

290 Id. citing Nabisco v. PFBrands, 50 F. Supp.2d 188, 202-206 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
291 Id. at 258 n.23 citing Mead Data v. Toyota Motor Sales, 875 F.2d at
1030.
292 Conopco v. Cosmair,49 F. Supp.2d at 258.
293 Id.
294 Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 50
U.S.P.Q.2d. 1454 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
295 Id. at 1455.
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product" from PanavisionInternational,L.P. v. Toeppen.796 Using
this definition of blurring along with the Mead Data factors, the
court found that Times Mirror was likely to prevail on its dilution
297
claim.
V. ANALYSIS

The Fourth Circuit's Ringling decision makes it much more
difficult for the plaintiff to succeed on a claim of trademark
dilution under the FTDA. In fact, no court has found for the
plaintiff using the Fourth Circuit standard.298 While this standard
may be difficult to satisfy, it is the correct one as dictated by
FTDA's language and history.
A. The Language of the FTDA Supports the Actual Dilution
Requirement
The language of the FTDA clearly indicates that relief will only
be granted if the junior use of the mark "causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark."2' 9 When Congress passed the
FTDA it was well aware that 25 states had dilution statutes of their
own and was most certainly aware that those state statutes
provided relief if the junior mark caused a likelihood of dilution of
the senior mark."' It is clear that Congress deliberately left out the
word "likelihood" in its drafting of the FTDA. Reading the FTDA
296 Id. at 1459 (citing Panavision,141 F.3d 1316).
297 Id. at 1460.
298 The following courts have specifically followed the Fourth Circuit
Ringling Decision: Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper, Corp., 193 F.3d
633 (7th Cir. 1999), Carnival Corp. v. SeaEscape Casino Cruises, Inc., 74 F.
Supp.2d 1261 (S.D. Fla. 1999), World Gym Licensing, Ltd. v. Fitness World,
Inc., 47 F. Supp.2d 614 (D. Md. 1999), American Cyanamid Co. v.
Nutraceutical Corp., 54 F. Supp.2d 379 (D. N.J. 1999), Playboy Enterprises,
Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp.2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999),
National Football League Properties, Inc. and Green Bay Packers, Inc. v.
Prostyle, Inc., 57 F. Supp.2d 665 (E.D. Wis. 1999).
299 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added).
300 H.R. Rep. No. 374, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1995, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1995 WL 709280 (Leg.Hist.).
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as it was drafted by Congress, no conclusion is possible other than
that a showing of actual dilution is required for relief under the
FTDA.
The FTDA defines dilution as the "lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services."3 °
Some commentators have interpreted this definition to refer to the
lessening of a future capacity of the famous mark to identify and
distinguish its source.3" 2 As a result, they claim that the FTDA
provides protection against the likelihood that a junior mark will
dilute not only a famous mark's current capacity to identify its
source, but also any likelihood that the junior mark will dilute the
famous mark's future capacity to identify its source.3"3
Such an interpretation of the FTDA's use of the word "capacity"
in its definition of "blurring" excessively reads into the plain
meaning of the statute. If Congress did intend to protect a famous
mark's future capacity to identify its source, it would have
included language as such. Interpreting "capacity," which is
hidden in the definition of "blurring," to provide an extra
dimension of protection to the FTDA is unfounded. Not only does
this interpretation give a new meaning to the language of the
statute as a whole, it also gives a new and unintended meaning to
the word "capacity" as used in the statute. The statute does not
preface the word "capacity" with any temporal modifiers so as to
make the statute read "future capacity of a famous mark to identify
and distinguish goods or services." Failing to include such a
301 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (emphasis added).
302 Courtland L. Reichman, State and Federal Trademark Dilution,
Franchise L. J. 111, 132 (Spring 1998) (noting that the FTDA appears to require
a showing of actual dilution but supporting the less stringent requirement that a
plaintiff only needs to demonstrate a likelihood of dilution because the
likelihood "interpretation squares with the definition's use of the word
'capacity', which indicates that it is the junior user's ability to dilute that is
actionable, not actual dilution in the marketplace"). Cited in Ringling, 170 at
461 n. 6; See also 3 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarksand Unfair
Competition, §§ 24:94, 24:151 stating "[t]he [federal Act] does not require proof
of an actual lessening of the strength of the famous mark: only that there is a
lessening of the capacity or the ability of the mark to be strong as a commercial
symbol and identifier."
303 Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss1/7
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temporal modifier suggests that Congress intended "capacity" to
denote a "present capacity." This "present capacity" interpretation
is supported by the statute's "causes dilution" language. The
statute clearly provides a remedy against a junior mark that "causes
dilution," not a junior mark that "could cause" dilution or that
"may cause dilution."
According to Nabisco, the Ringling court engaged in "excessive
literalism" in its reading that a showing of actual dilution is
required under the FTDA.3" The Nabisco court held that the
Ringling decision "defeat(s) the intent of the statute" which is that
Congress intended to "provide for an injunction to prevent the
harm before it occurs. 0 5 However, the Nabisco court gave no
support for its position. By ignoring the language of the statute, it
is the Nabisco court that is not following the intent of the statute.
The Ringling court relied on the only information that it had, the
language and history of the FTDA. On the other hand, as seen in
the next section, the Nabisco court decided to read its own
meaning into the statute so as to produce the outcome it desired.
B. The Actual Dilution Requirement Will Not Cause the
ProblemsSuggested by the Nabisco Court
The problems which the Nabisco court claimed will result if
courts follow the actual dilution requirement are unfounded. The
Nabisco court claimed that proof of actual loss of revenue should
not be required to obtain relief under the FTDA because "if the
famous senior mark were being exploited with continually growing
success, the senior user might never be able to show diminished
revenues."3 6 After a junior user has used the senior user's famous
mark for an extended period of time in the marketplace, it may
indeed be difficult to show dilution through loss of revenues.
However, in many cases it will be possible to look back at
revenues during the time period when the junior user first
appropriated the famous mark. A gradual shift in revenue from the
304 Nabisco v. PFBrands,Inc., 191 F.3d at 224.
305 Id.
306 Id.
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senior user to the junior during the period in which the junior user
first implemented the mark would indicate that the senior user's
mark had been diluted.
If there is no evidence of a shift in revenue at the time the junior
user implemented the famous mark, dilution could still be proven
through the use of a consumer survey. Nabisco claims that
consumer surveys are subject to manipulation and are not very
reliable. However, if the survey is carried out by an independent
third party and conducted in the proper manner it will be accepted
by the courts as proof of dilution. 7
The Nabisco court also criticized the Ringling court's actual
dilution requirement because such a requirement would require that
the junior user already be established in the marketplace before the
senior user could seek an injunction. Thus, the junior user would
be forced to spend the "huge sums involved in a product launch
without the ability to seek prior judicial assurance that their mark
will not be enjoined."3 8 However, such a provision will in many
cases help the junior user rather than harm it. If the likelihood of
dilution standard is adopted many marks may be enjoined which, if
allowed to be used in the market place, may not actually dilute the
senior's mark. The actual dilution standard allows the junior user
to place the mark in commerce so that a determination can be made
as to whether it actually dilutes a famous mark. The likelihood
standard would deprive the junior user of such an opportunity. In
addition, if a junior user is truly nervous that its newly developed
mark will dilute the famous mark, the prudent decision would be to
change its mark so as to avoid such a conflict.

307 WAWA Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1632 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
"Although the Defendant's expert categorized the market survey as unreliable,"
the court found that the "Plaintiff's market survey is credible and supports [its]
own conclusion that HAHA 24 HR. Market is undermining the strength of
WAWA either through dilution or parody."
308 Nabisco, Inc. vi PFBrands, Inc., 191 F.3d at 224.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss1/7
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C. Many DecisionsSupporting the Likelihood Standard Under
the FTDA Improperly Rely on State Dilution Cases
Many cases which support the likelihood of dilution standard
cite cases decided under state dilution statutes for support.
However, as discussed above state dilution and dilution under the
FTDA have two crucial differences, the most important of which
for the purpose of this paper is that the FTDA does not grant relief
for a likelihood of dilution."M Courts which engage in this practice
are deceiving themselves and the parties involved into thinking that
their decision is based on the FTDA, when it is in fact based on the
state dilution statute used in the case they chose to cite.
In Panavision, the Ninth Circuit defined dilution by blurring as
occurring when "a defendant uses a plaintiffs trademark to
identify the defendant's goods or services, creating the possibility
3 10
that the mark will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier."
However, the court cited Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey,
Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows, Corp.31 which cited
Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc.3" Deere was decided in 1994
and, because the FTDA was not passed until 1996, the case could
not have been referring to the FTDA. Deere was in fact referring
to the New York antidilution statute.31 3
In Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. 314 the court similarly cited
Panavision31 5 for the proposition that dilution by blurring occurs
when there is a possibility that the senior mark will lose its ability
to serve as a unique identifier of the plaintiffs product. In

309 See supra notes 27-28.
310 Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 n.7 (9th

Cir. 1998).
311 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey, Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E.
Windows, Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
312 Deere & Co. v.MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
313 Id. at 43.
314 Times Mirrorv. Las Vegas Sports News, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1454, 1459.
315 Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 n.7 (9th

Cir. 1998).
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addition, Avery Dennison316 cited Panavision317 for support of the
likelihood standard it chose to adopt.
Elvis Presley Enterprises,Inc.3al also improperly cited a state
dilution case for its proposition that the FTDA requires only a
likelihood of dilution. To add authority to its position that only a
likelihood of dilution is required for a claim under the FTDA, the
Elvis court cited Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions,
Inc. 3"9 However, Hormel Foods specifically dealt with a dilution
claim under the New York State antidilution statute. The Elvis
court's reliance on a court which specifically dealt with a state
dilution statute for the proposition that the FTDA will grant relief
after a showing of a mere likelihood of dilution was improper.
D. The Ringling Standardis Clear
The Nabisco court rejected the Ringling standard in part because
it was not clear as to what standard Ringling adopted. However,
the Ringling opinion is quite clear in the standard it chose to adopt.
The Ringling court requires proof of actual dilution to be
demonstrated in order to obtain relief under the FTDA. In
addition, the court rejected the use of the Mead Data contextual
analysis to infer dilution. 320 The court correctly found that the
Mead Data factors were developed to determine if a likelihood of
dilution was present under state antidilution statutes.32 Ringling's
316 Avery Dennison Corp. v. Jerry Sunpton, 189 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.
1999).
317 Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 n.7 (9th

Cir. 1998).
318 Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Tex.
1996).
319 Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 506
(2d. Cir. 1996).
320 Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d
1026, 1032-1038 (2d Cir. 1989). In a concurrence, Judge Sweet developed a six
factor test to determine if a likelihood of dilution existed under New York
antidilution law.
321 However, the court did find that the factors examining the similarity of
the marks and the degree of renown of the senior mark may have relevance
under the FTDA. Ringling Bros. v. Utah, 170 F.3d. at 465.
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discussion of both points is clearly laid out and separated by
Arabic numerals. If the Nabisco court was unclear as to the
Ringling requirements, it should have at least performed its own
thorough interpretation of the statute. Instead, it simply rejected
Ringling and stated that "notwithstanding the use of the present
tense in 'causes dilution,' it seems plausibly within Congress's
meaning to understand the statute as intending to provide for an
injunction to prevent the harm before it occurs."
VI, CONCLUSION

The Ringling court's decision to require a showing of actual
dilution in order to receive relief under the FTDA clearly makes it
difficult for the senior user of a famous mark to gain relief.
However, this is the standard required by the language of the
FTDA and the history of the dilution concept which preceded the
FTDA. The Ringling decision should not be viewed as raising the
bar as to the level of proof required under the FTDA. Instead, the
decision should be viewed as a return to the proper standard
intended by Congress.
Brent G. Seitz
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